Abstract
It is shown that the intuitionistic propositional calculus is sound and complete with respect to Kripke-style models that are not quasi-ordered. These models, called rudimentary Kripke models, differ from the ordinary intuitionistic Kripke models by making fewer assumptions about the underlying frames, but have the same conditions for valuations. However, since accessibility between points in the frames need not be reflexive, we have to assume, besides the usual intuitionistic heredity, the converse of heredity, which says that if a formula holds in all points accessible to a point X, then it holds in X. Among frames of rudimentary Kripke models, particular attention is paid to those that guarantee that the assumption of heredity and converse heredity for propositional variables implies heredity and converse heredity for all propositional formulae. These frames need to be neither reflexive nor transitive.
The intuitionistic propositional calculus, which we call H (after Heyting), is sound and complete with respect to Kripke models based on quasi-ordered frames. Besides this class of Kripke models there are many smaller classes of Kripke models with respect to which H is sound and complete. For example, we may require from the frames of Kripke models that in addition to being quasi-ordered they satisfy one or more of the following: -the frame is partially ordered (i.e., we have added antisymmetry), -the frame is generated (i.e., there is a point which is lesser than or equal to every point), -the frame is a tree, -the frame is a Jaskowski tree, -the frame is finite.
The propositional calculus H is also sound and complete with respect to classes of Kripke models which are all based on a single frame (for example, this frame may be the disjoint union of all finite quasi-ordered frames), or with respect to classes which contain a single Kripke model (like the class whose only member is the canonical model for H, familiar from the Henkin-style completeness proof for H).
For all these classes of Kripke models the class of all quasi-ordered Kripke models is the largest class, in which all are included. Here we will consider classes of models with respect to which H can be shown sound and complete in which the class of all ordinary quasi-ordered Kripke models is properly included. In producing models in these wider classes we will feel free to tamper as much as we can with the conditions on the underlying frames, while the conditions concerning valuations on these frames and the definition of holding in a model will be practically identical to those in ordinary Kripke models for H. These new models are not meant to replace ordinary Kripke models for the investigation of H. Neither are they meant to be philosophically significant. We want to have them rather as an instrument for the analysis of the inner mechanism of Kripke models. But they might also raise some interesting technical questions.
Our models delimit a field within which we can look for new models without ever leaving standard Kripke models too far behind. Since Kripke models for intuitionistic logic are often taken as a paradigm when we try to model other nonclassical logics, it might be worth knowing all the possibilities inherent in this paradigm, lest we should be stranded by a too narrow imitation of features that are perhaps accidental. (In [6] one can find models for logics based on weaker implications, like relevant and linear implication, that are in some respect analogous to models introduced here.)
The spirit of this paper will be close to the spirit of correspondence theory (see [l] and [ll] ). A number of our results will be of the form that a frame satisfies certain conditions concerning its relation iff it satisfies certain conditions concerning valuations on it, or something similar. However, this is not a paper at the level of correspondence theory, because it does not go far enough. It only introduces notions, and proves for them rather straightforward matters which perhaps could lead to a more advanced theory.
We will concentrate here only on propositional logic and leave aside a possible extension of our approach to predicate logic. The paper will be divided into three sections. In the first section we introduce our main generalization of Kripke models for H, called rudimentary Kripke models. The frames of these models must be only serial, but in the absence of reflexivity we assume for valuations on these frames a condition converse to the usual heredity condition of ordinary Kripke models for H. We prove that H is sound and complete with respect to rudimentary Kripke models, and consider questions related to completeness. We show that in a certain sense rudimentary Kripke models make the largest class of Kripke-type models with respect to which H is strongly sound and complete.
In the second section we present a canonical Kripke and the rule modus ponens. It is well known that this axiomatization is separative, in the sense that an axiomatization of a fragment of H involving some connectives, among which we must have 4, is obtained by assuming modus ponens and all those axiom-schemata from the list above in which the connectives of the fragment in question occur. So the positive intuitionistic propositional calculus H+ in L+ .
IS axiomatized by deleting _L -j A, and the implicational fragment of H, i.e. the system H-in L", is axiomatized by the first two axiom-schemata and modus ponens.
A frame is a pair ( W, R) where W is a nonempty set and R a binary relation A valuation v on a frame ( W, R) is a pseudo-valuation which satisfies The only part of this verification which is not quite straightforward is when in the verification that U' is a valuation on (W, R') we have to check that u' satisfies (v+), i.e., when we show that
Vy ((3k 2 0) xRky 2' (Y E v(B) 3 y E v(C)>) iff vy (x RY + (Y E v(B) 3 Y E v(C))).
From left to right we just appeal to the fact that x R y =$ (3k 2 0) x Rk y. For the other direction suppose that for some y we have (3 3 and yen(C).
q As a kind of converse of Proposition 6 we can demonstrate the following:
Proposition

For every quasi-ordered Kripke model (W, R, v) there is a rudimentary Kripke model ( W*, R*, u*) which is not quasi-ordered such that for every A we have v(A) = W iff v*(A) = W*.
Proof If ('jz, t E W*)(z R* t + f(z) Rf (t)),
(Vz E W*)(Vy E W)(f(z) Ry 3 (3 E W*)(f(t) =y &z R* t)).
We also have for every z E W* and every formula A that
z E v*(A) e f(z) E v(A).
More generally, we can prove Proposition 7 by letting W* be the disjoint union of two or more sets l4$, each in one-one correspondence with W. On Wi for every x, y E W such that x f y we have xi R; yi iff x R y, but for some xi E Wi we may lack xi Ri xi, which makes ( w, Ri) nonreflexive. In the relation R * on W* is included the union of all the relations Ri and moreover for every xi E Wi we have an xi E Wj such that xi R* xi. If one of the frames (V$, Ri) is nonreflexive, then (W*, R*) is nonreflexive, whereas transitivity will fail if xi R* xi and xi R* xk but not xi R* xk (in the proof of Proposition 7 above, transitivity fails for a different reason). The set u*(A) is the union of all the sets vi(A) = {xi E Wi: x E v(A)}. The frame ( W, R ) is a pseudo-epimorphic image of ( W *, R * ) under f : W * --f W defined by f(xJ =x, and we have xi E v*(A) iff f(xJ E v(A).
Proposition 6 says that for every rudimentary Kripke model there is a quasi-ordered Kripke model in which the same formulae hold, and since the converse is trivially satisfied, it might seem that rudimentary Kripke models do not bring anything new. However, they may bring something new if instead of holding in a model we consider holding in a frame. We say that A holds in a frame (W, R) iff for every valuation II on (W, R) we have that A holds in (W, R, IJ). Our soundness and completeness result of Proposition 5 can equivalently be expressed in terms of holding in frames; namely, B is provable in H iff B holds in every serial frame.
It is also true that B is provable in H iff B holds in every frame, for if a frame (W, R) is not serial, then, since there are no valuations on (W, R), it is vacuously satisfied that for every valuation TV on ( W, R ) every formula A holds in (W, R, v). This is like accepting among our rudimentary Kripke models also models where W is empty, since if W is empty, every formula A holds vacuously in ( W, R, v). The problem with these vacuous holdings is that every formula, even I, will have a model, or a frame in which it holds. So, we should exclude vacuous holdings from our considerations.
In [12] Shekhtman gave an example of an intermediate propositional logic S incomplete with respect to any class of partially ordered frames; i.e., there is no class (e of partially ordered frames such that B is provable in S iff B holds in every frame in %. It follows easily that there is no class '% of quasi-ordered frames such that B is provable in S iff B holds in every frame in %, since for every quasi-ordered frame there is a partially ordered frame in which the same formulae hold (for the quasi-ordered frame ( W, R) we take the partially ordered frame (W',R') where with [x]={y: xRy&yRx} we have W'={[x]: XE W} and [x] R' [y] iff x R y). However, for all we know, it seems possible that a logic like S be incomplete with respect to any class of quasi-ordered frames but nevertheless complete with respect to a class of serial frames, where the holding of formulae in serial frames is defined in terms of rudimentary Kripke models. In the proof of Proposition 6 we produced out of a rudimentary Kripke model (W, R, v) a quasi-ordered Kripke model (W, R', u') in which the same formulae hold, but this does not mean that in (W, R) and (W, R') the same formulae will hold. Every valuation u on (W, R) will induce an equivalent valuation U' on (W, R'), as in the proof of Proposition 6, but on (W, R') we might have valuations to which no valuation corresponds on (W, R). For example, let in (W, R) not x Rx; then for a V' on ( W, R') we can have
and Vy ((3 2 1)x Rky + y E v'(A)), but for no u on ( W, R) we can have
and Vy ((3k 3 1)x Rky j y E v(A)).
So we ask the following question:
(1) Is there an intermediate propositional logic incomplete with respect to any class of quasi-ordered frames but complete with respect to a class of serial frames?
When we show that a logic like Shekhtman's S is incomplete with respect to any class of quasi-ordered frames we find a formula B which is not a theorem of S but which holds in every quasi-ordered frame in which all the theorems of S hold. In order to show that B is not a theorem of S, or of a similar logic, we can use a more general type of frames (like the general, or @t-order, frames in modal logic; see [9, pp. 62-671). Can serial frames be used for the same purpose, namely:
(2) Is there a set of formulae F and a formula B such that in every quasi-ordered frame in which all the members of r hold B holds too, whereas there is a serial frame in which all the members of F hold and B does not hold?
A positive answer to (1) entails a positive answer to (2), but (2) seems to be a weaker question. A question related to (1) Before proving this proposition let us note that its right-hand side:
(*I Kripke models is properly included in the largest class of pseudo-Kripke models with respect to which H is strongly sound and complete in the sense that for every r and B, r I-B iff (*); and the latter class is properly included in the largest class of pseudo-Kripke models with respect to which we can prove the ordinary soundness and completeness of H.
The Kolmogorov-Johansson, or minimal, intuitionistic propositional calculus J in L is obtained by deleting I -+ A from our axiomatization of H. This system does not differ essentially from H+, and it is not difficult to obtain a soundness and completeness result for J with respect to 'rudimentary' Kripke models which differ from rudimentary Kripke models for H only in not requiring v(l) = 0; the set v(l) can be an arbitrary hereditary and conversely hereditary set. 'Rudimentary' Kripke models for J need not be serial, and their frames may be completely arbitrary.
(So Johansson may after all have been right in calling J minimal.)
A canonical rudimentary Kripke model
We shall now consider a nontrivial rudimentary Kripke model which is not quasi-ordered, but is analogous to the canonical partially ordered Kripke model familiar from the Henkin-style completeness proof for H.
A set of formulae r is consistent iff for some A not r IA; the set r is deductively closed iff for every A we have that r I-A implies A E r; and r has the disjunction property iff for every A and B we have that A v B E r implies A E r or B E r. A set of formulae which is consistent, deductively closed and has the disjunction property will be called a prime theory.
A set of formulae r will be called A-maximal iff A $ r and for every B, either B E r or B + A E r. It is easy to check that a prime theory r is maximal (in the sense that for every prime theory A if r c A, then r = A) iff r is I-maximal (the same holds when we replace prime theories by consistent deductively closed sets).
Let W, = {r: r is a prime theory}, and let us define on WC the relation R, by From left to right this follows immediately from the fact that TR, A implies r c A. For the other direction suppose A + B $ r; hence B 4 r If A E r and for some C the set r is C-maximal, we have TR, r, A E r and B 4 r. If A E r and there is no C such that r is C-maximal, then for some D we have D 4 r and D + B $ r, and we extend r U {D} to a prime theory A such that A E A and B $ A. This may be done by taking a maximal element of the set of all sets of formulae 0 such that r U {D} G 0 and not 0 t-B (this set is nonempty, since r U {D} is in it, and it is closed under unions of nonempty chains with respect to set inclusion; so, by Zorn's Lemma it has a maximal element A, for which we can check that it is the required prime theory). Similarly, if A $ r, we extend r U {A} to a prime theory A such that A E A and B $ A.
If in (I) we let A be C -+ C, then since in H we have B ++ ((C-+ C)+ B) we immediately obtain General Heredity and Converse General Heredity for u,. Cl
To prove the strong completeness of H with respect to rudimentary Kripke models we could use the canonical rudimentary Kripke model instead of the usual canonical Kripke model for H. As for the usual canonical model, if not r k B, then there is a prime theory A such that r E A and B 4 A.
The canonical rudimentary Kripke model for H is serial, as it follows from Proposition 1 (and as can directly be proved by copying the argument in the proof of Proposition 12). This model is also transitive, but it is not reflexive. Let r, be the set of theorems of H. The set r, is a prime theory for which there is no A such that r, is A-maximal. Otherwise there would be an A which is not a theorem of H such that for a propositional variable p foreign to A we would have that p v (p +A) is a theorem of H. So we don't have r, R, r,.
The set r, is not the only prime theory r for which there is no A such that r is A-maximal. Such are also all the prime theories r, = {C: {B} t C} where B is a Hurrop formula nonequivalent to I in H; that r, is a prime theory follows from the fact for Harrop formulae B we have that if {B} k C1 v C,, then either {B)kCi or {B]~CZ ( see [S] or [lo, p. 551). That there is no A such that r, is A-maximal is shown as follows. Suppose A 4 r,, i.e., not {B} I-A; then for a p foreign to both B and A we have that not {B} kp (otherwise we would have {B} t 1, and hence also {B} IA) and not {B} t-p +A (otherwise we would have {B} k (C+ C)-+A, and hence {B} t A). The prime theory r, is a particular case of a r, where B is the Harrop formula q +-q.
If in the building of the canonical Kripke model for H we start by assuming the definition of the canonical valuation u,, then General Heredity implies for every rand A The other direction of (v*) and the conditions (vl), (VA) and (vv), together with (II), (III) and the requirement that r, be included in every r, imply the definition of prime theories. For prime theories r and A we have that (I+) implies (III), and (II) is equivalent with the converse of (Ie If f(u) = {x E W,: a EX}, then ({f(u): u E a}, +Rd, fl, U, 0) is a Heyting algebra isomorphic to our initial Heyting algebra ti by the mappingf.
As before, the relation Rd, though it must be transitive, need not be reflexive. If d is the Lindenbaum algebra of H and x is the principal filter generated by the equivalence class of a Harrop formula nonequivalent to I, then x is a prime filter for which there is no a E J%! such that x is u-maximal (which is shown by an argument analogous to what we had above for the prime theories r,).
Inductive Kripke models
In this section we study frames for which it is enough to assume that pseudo-valuations on them satisfy Atomic Heredity and Converse Atomic Heredity in order to infer by induction on the complexity of A that General Heredity and Converse General Heredity are satisfied. These frames and the corresponding rudimentary Kripke models, which we will call inductive, will be more like ordinary frames and Kripke models for H, but we shall see that they need not be quasi-ordered.
In Before showing that the necessary and sufficient condition on frames for this induction to go through is weaker than transitivity we introduce the following notions.
For a frame ( W, R) and an arbitrary X E W let
ConeX={y: (3x~X)(3k~O)xR~y},
Cone-X= {y: not (3x~X)(3k2O)yR~x}.
The operations
Cone and Coneare connected with hereditary sets by the following two propositions, whose straightforward proofs will be omitted:
Proposition 13. For every frame ( W, R) and every X s W, the set Cone X is the least hereditary superset of X.
As a corollary of this proposition we obtain that X is hereditary iff Cone X = X. Proposition 14. For every frame ( W, R) and every X G W, the set Cone-X is the greatest hereditary set disjoint from X. We shall say that a relation R in a frame ( W, R) is weakly transitive iff
Vx, z (x R2 z j 3 (x R t & t E Cone(z) & z E Cone{t})).
Then we can prove: For the other direction suppose that for some x, y and z we have x R y, y R z and
Then by Propositions 13 and 14 it is clear that there is a pseudo-valuation v which satifies Atomic Heredity such that v(p,) = Cone(z) and u(pJ = Cone-(z).
We know that z $ Cone(t) iff t E Cone-(z).
It follows that x E v(p, +p2), but since z E v(pi) and z 4 u(p2), we have Y 4 V(P, +p2). So v does not satisfy General Heredity. Cl
This proposition shows that in every weakly transitive frame ( W, R ) the set Se of all hereditary subsets of W contains 0 and is closed under the operations +R, fl and U. Moreover, the weak transitivity of R is not only sufficient but also necessary for that to be the case. The algebra (&, *R, n, U, 0) is a distributive lattice with zero which for every X, Y, .Z E & satisfies
The converse implication may fail. For example, let X = W+, 0, Y = W and Z = 0; then a dead end x, i.e. a point x such that there is no y for which x R y, will belong to (W+, 0) n W but cannot belong to 0. So our algebra a is not necessarily a Heyting algebra. Weak transitivity is satisfied by transitive frames, but it is clear that this is a weaker condition than transitivity. This condition is exclusively tied to the connective --, and is not invoked in any other part of the proof of Proposition 15, not involving -+.
However, in connexion with rudimentary Kripke models we are not interested in inferring General Heredity from Atomic Heredity, as we did in the proof of Proposition 15, but we want to infer General Heredity and Converse General Heredity from Atomic Heredity and Converse Atomic Heredity. In other words, we want to infer that a pseudo-valuation which satisfies Atomic Heredity and Converse Atomic Heredity is a valuation. In order to show what are the necessary and sufficient conditions on frames for this, we shall introduce the following notions.
For a frame ( W, R ) a nonempty subset X of W will be called an o-chain from x iff there is a mapping f from the ordinal w onto X such that f(0) =x and (Vn E w) f(n) Rf(n + 1). Let o(x) = {X E W: X is an w-chain from x}. An w-chain from x makes an infinite sequence xoxixz * * . such that x,, =x and for every n 2 0 we have x, Rx,+, . Since fin the definition of w-chains need not be one-one, there may be repetitions in the sequence xoxlxz . . * , and an o-chain need not be infinite; it may actually be the singleton {x} if x R x. In arbitrary frames there may be points x such that o(x) is empty; for example, x may be a dead end. For every x the set o(x) is nonempty iff our frame is serial.
Foraframe (W,R) andXcWlet CI,X={y: (VYEo(y))YnX#0}.
The set Cl, X contains all the points y such that every w-chain from y intersects X. Every y such that o(y) is empty will also belong to Cl, X, since for such a y it is vacuously satisfied that every w-chain from y intersects X. is an w-chain from z disjoint from X, i.e., z 4 Cl, X. To show that Cl, X is the least conversely hereditary superset of X suppose Y is conversely hereditary and X c Y, and let there be an x such that x E Cl, X, i.e., (VZ E o(x)) Z fl X # 0, and x 4 Y. Since Y is conversely hereditary there is a Z' E w(x) such that Z' U X = 0, which is a contradiction.
So Cl, X E Y. 0
As a corollary of this proposition we obtain that X is conversely hereditary iff &X=X.
Propositions 16 and 13 show that Cl, is analogous to Cone. Is there an operation analogous to Cone-, which applied to X would give the greatest conversely hereditary set disjoint from X? The following example shows that such an operation need not exist. Let W = (0, 1, 2) and R = { (0, l), (0, 2), (1, l), (2, 2)}. Then the greatest conversely hereditary set disjoint from (0) does not exist ({l} and (2) are conversely hereditary, but { 1,2} is not).
The following proposition connects the operation Cl,, and conversely hereditary sets, with reflexivity: We are now ready to show what are the necessary and sufficient conditions on frames for inferring that every pseudo-valuation which satisfies Atomic Heredity and Converse Atomic Heredity is a valuation. We shall say that in a frame ( W, R) the relation R is prototransitive iff
Vx, z (x R2 z + (VZ E o(z)) 3 (x R t & t E Cl, Cone(z)
This condition says that if x RZ z, then for every w-chain 2 from z there is a t such that x R t, every w-chain from t intersects Cone(z), and there is an w-chain from t which is disjoint from Cone-Z. If for X, Y c W we have that for every x E X there is a y E Y such that (3 2 0) x Rk y (i.e., for every x E X we have Y fl Cone(x) #O), we shall say that X is a shadow of Y. The last conjunct above, which claims that there is an o-chain from t which is disjoint from Cone-Z, says that this w-chain from t is a shadow of the o-chain Z. Note that the consequent of the condition of prototransitivity is satisfied vacuously if o(z) is empty. Every transitive relation is prototransitive. For suppose R is transitive, x R2 z and Z is an w-chain from z. Then we have x R z, z E Cl,, Cone(z) and there is an w-chain from z, namely Z itself, which is a shadow of the o-chain Z. We also have that every weakly transitive relation is prototransitive, but, of course, prototransitivity entails neither weak transitivity nor transitivity.
We shall say that in a frame ( W, R) the relation R is protoreflexive iff This condition says that if X, and X2 are w-chains from x, not necessarily distinct, then there is a y such that x R y and from y we have an o-chain which is a shadow of X, and an o-chain which is a shadow of X2. Every reflexive relation is protoreflexive.
For if R is reflexive, then for o-chains X1 and X2 from x we have x Rx, and Xi is a shadow of Xi and X2 a shadow of X2. Of course, protoreflexivity does not entail reflexivity. We can now prove the proposition for which we have been preparing all along: 
Proof. (3)
We proceed by induction on the complexity of A in order to show that v satisfies General Heredity and Converse General Heredity.
In the basis of this induction we use the seriality of R in order to demonstrate that v(l) is conversely hereditary. and v(pJ = Cl, Cone-Z. It follows that x E v(pI*p2). We also have z E v(pJ and z 4 v(pJ, because Z fl Cone-Z = 0 (otherwise for some t E Z we would have t E Cone-Z, but tR" t). So y $ v(p1-+p2), and General Heredity fails.
Suppose R is not protoreflexive, i.e., for some x there are X1, X2 E CO(X) such that Vy (x R y 3 (y E Cl, Cone-X1 or y E Cl, Cone-X2)). If holding in frames is defined in terms of pseudo-valuations which satisfy only Atomic Heredity, as for ordinary Kripke models for H, then H is not sound with respect to inductive frames. We know that in this sense H is sound and complete with respect to quasi-ordered frames, but there is an interesting class of frames properly in between the class of inductive frames and the class of quasi-ordered frames with respect to which H is also sound and complete in this sense. This is the largest class of frames such that every pseudo-valuation on a frame in this class which satisfies Atomic Heredity will also satisfy General Heredity and Converse General Heredity. Frames in this class, called weakly quasi-ordered frames, satisfy weak reflexivity:
Then by Propositions
Vx(3k>l)xRkx and weak transitivity from Proposition 15:
Vx, z (x R2 z 3 3 (x R t & t E Cone(z) & z E Cone(t))).
Reflexivity of course entails weak reflexivity but not vice versa. Also, every quasi-ordered frame is weakly quasi-ordered, but not vice versa.
The following proposition about weak reflexivity is analogous to Proposition 17:
Proposition 20. In a frame ( W, R) the relation R is weakly reflexive iff for every hereditary X c W we have Cl, X = X.
Proof. (3)
Suppose R is weakly reflexive, X c W is hereditary and x E Cl, X.
From weak reflexivity it follows that there is an o-chain 2 from x in which x is cyclically repeated. Since 2 n X # 0 and X is hereditary we get x E X.
(+) Suppose for some x not (3k 3 1)x Rkx. Then the set Cone,(x) = {y: (3k 3 1)x Rky} is hereditary and x E Cl, Cone,(x), but x $ Cone,(x).
Cl
As a corollary we obtain: Propositions 15 and 21 from right to left show that weak reflexivity and weak transitivity are necessary if we want to infer General Heredity and Converse General Heredity from Atomic Heredity. That these conditions are also sufficient follows from Propositions 15 and 20 from left to right.
We can easily verify that weakly quasi-ordered frames could alternatively be defined by assuming weak reflexivity and prototransitivity.
So weak reflexivity, which entails seriality and protoreflexivity, is really the new assumption we make when we pass from the class of inductive frames to its proper subclass made of all weakly quasi-ordered frames.
We have already shown in Proposition 15 that the weak transitivity of R in a frame (W, R) is necessary and sufficient for the set d of all hereditary subsets of W to contain 0 and be closed under the operations +R, fl and U. However, (&$, +*, fl, U, 0) need not have been a Heyting algebra. Proposition 20 shows that the weak reflexivity of R is necessary and sufficient to make every member of d conversely hereditary. So for every weakly quasi-ordered frame, (&, +R, 13, U, 0) is a Heyting algebra.
We also prove the following opposite of Proposition 21: We infer that x E v(p) and y I$ v(p), i.e., Atomic Heredity fails. 0
This proposition shows what happens if we define holding in frames in terms of pseudo-valuations which satisfy only Converse Atomic Heredity and expect these pseudo-valuations to give rise to rudimentary Kripke models. We know that frames for rudimentary Kripke models must be serial, and with seriality the condition of Proposition 22 entails that if x R y, then x E Cone{ y}, which with General Heredity would give that for every A we have x E v(A) iff y E v(A). But with that, every theorem of the classical propositional calculus would hold. Of course, the condition of Proposition 22 need not be satisfied by quasi-ordered frames.
We have characterized inductive frames and weakly quasi-ordered frames by conditions on pseudo-valuations which indicate that we can define inductively valuations on these frames. Is there a similar characterization of quasi-ordered frames in terms of conditions necessary and sufficient to make valuations inductively definable in some way? The condition on pseudo-valuations which corresponds to reflexivity is contained in Proposition 17, which says that in reflexive frames ( W, R), and only in reflexive frames, every subset of W is conversely hereditary. So reflexivity implies Converse General Heredity. On the other hand, transitivity secures the hereditariness of v(A,+A2) , as the following proposition shows: This proposition from left to right shows that when for transitive frames we prove by induction on the complexity of A that pseudo-valuations on them which satisfy Atomic Heredity satisfy General Heredity, in the induction step we don't need the induction hypothesis for the case when A is of the form Al-AZ.
Though the conditions corresponding to reflexivity and transitivity are sufficient for the inductive character of valuations, it is not clear what conception of this inductive character would make reflexivity and transitivity also necessary. No doubt, quasi-ordered Kripke models stand out by their simplicity and naturalness, and they are not very far from weakly quasi-ordered rudimentary Kripke models. However, it seems that the preponderance of quasi-ordered Kripke models could not be justified by saying that only in these models valuations are inductively defined.
The previous results show that the assumptions of reflexivity and transitivity for ordinary quasi-ordered Kripke models for H are not exactly in the same position. Transitivity secures prototransitivity and weak transitivity, which are tied to implication. Reflexivity secures protoreflexivity, which is tied to disjunction, but it secures also seriality and weak reflexivity, which are not tied to disjunction. Reflexivity also secures at one stroke Converse General Heredity. With reflexivity we have reduced an assumption about valuations to an assumption purely about frames, which does not mention valuations.
If reflexivity is written as R" G R, the converse condition R c R" would be sufficient for General Heredity as reflexivity is sufficient for Converse General Heredity. However, though we can replace Converse General Heredity by reflexivity, we cannot replace general Heredity by R c R". By assuming R G R" we would immediately bring in classical propositional logic.
Among inductive frames we find frames in which R is serial, transitive and satisfies branching density :
which is a stronger version of protoreflexivity. These inductive frames need not be weakly quasi-ordered. That H is sound and complete with respect to these frames, with inductive valuations, was shown in [3] . These frames are interesting because they are the frames with respect to which the normal modal propositional logic K4N can be shown sound and complete (of course, with usual modal valuations on these frames). The system K4N is axiomatized by adding to the weakest normal modal propositional logic K the following axiom-schemata: This system is the weakest normal modal propositional logic in which H can be embedded by the modal translation which prefixes 0 to every proper subformula which is a propositional variable or an implication. (This is shown in [3] ; the language in [3] has 1 as primitive instead of I, but the modal translation just mentioned does not differ essentially from the translation considered there in connexion with the minimality of K4N since here 0 is not prefixed to 1.) The schema (bd) defines branching density on frames, in the sense that a frame satisfies branching density iff every instance of (bd) holds in this frame (with respect to usual modal valuations). That in the same sense (s) defines seriality, and (t) transitivity, are among the oldest examples in the correspondence theory of modal logic (see [l] ). It is not clear whether the other conditions we have met in connexion with inductive frames: weak reflexivity, weak transitivity, protoreflexivity and prototransitivity, may be defined by modal schemata. The sentences by which we have introduced these conditions are not first-order. The following first-order condition related to weak reflexivity:
t'x (x R'x), where k 2 0, is defined by the modal schema OkA -+A, where q "A is A and q kC1A is q O"A. Similarly, the following first-order condition related to weak transitivity:
Vx,z(.xR2z + 3t(xRt&zRkt&tRmz)), where k, m 3 0, is defined by:
'7(B* PC)* q "(OkB+ C).
The schema (t), i.e. q A+ q 'A, is equivalent to this schema when k = m = 0.
